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Abstract
It is known that simple price limiters may have unexpected consequences in irregular commod-
ity price ﬂuctuations between bull and bear markets and complicated impacts on the size of
buffer stocks. In particular, imposing a lower price boundary may lead to a huge buffer stock,
e.g. to a “butter mountain” or a “milk lake” and this is a real problem for regulators since
storage costs may become impossible to ﬁnance over time. The relation between price limiters
and the size of buffer stocks is nontrivial and there may exist some optimal price limiters which
require only weak market interventions and thus provide a rather inexpensive option to regulate
commodity markets. In this paper, we use a simple commodity market model to explore the
relation between price limiters and the average growth rate of the buffer stocks. It is found that
these optimal price limiter levels are simply the minimum values of unstable periodic orbits of
the underlying deterministic system.
Keywords: Commodity markets, price stabilization, limiter control, butter mountains and milk
lakes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Commoditypricesareextremelyvolatileandregularlydisplaysevereboomsandbusts. Many
countries thus have experimented with some form of commodity price stabilization scheme in
the past (Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)). In particular, attempts have been made to stabilize
agricultural commodity markets by means of a commodity buffer stock scheme. The idea of
such a scheme is to put a certain amount of output into storage in years in which there is a good
harvest, thus increasing the price from what it would have been, and to sell output from the
storage in years in which there is a small harvest, thus reducing the price from what it would
have been. Although theoretically appealing, these stabilization schemes turned out to be a
mixed blessing in reality. Especially in Europe, price guarantees offered by market regulators
led to excessive production which had to be taken up by state agencies. The surplus output
was stored and periodically amounted in embarrassing phenomena like “butter mountains” and
“milk lakes”, associated with signiﬁcant storage costs. It is thus important to understand the
relation between price limiters and the growth of buffer stocks, in particular, the optimal price
limiters which require only weak market interventions and thus provide a rather inexpensive
option to regulate commodity markets, and this is indeed the goal of this paper.
To characterize the nature of commodity price ﬂuctuation, He and Westerhoff (2005) de-
velop a behavioral market model with consumers, producers and heterogeneous speculators.
Motivated by recent chaos control literature (e.g. Corron, Pethel and Hopper (2000)), they
show that a central authority may stabilize the cyclical behavior of commodity prices by im-
posing price boundaries. Within this model, we present evidence that the size of buffer stocks
depends in a nonlinear way on the imposed price limiters. While most price limiters lead to
huge buffer stocks, there also exist some optimal price limiters which may be defendend with
rather weak market interventions. We show that these optimal price levels are closely related to
the minimum values of unstable periodic orbits of the underlying deterministic system. Hence,
if it is politically desirable to stabilize commodity markets, central authorities may have the
opportunity to do this without accumulating large and costly inventories.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy recall the model of He
and Westerhoff (2005). In section 3, we we analyze the relationship between price limiters and
the growth rate of buffer stocks. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2. THE MODEL
He and Westerhoff (2005) develop a stylized commodity market model with consumers, pro-
ducers and speculators.
1 Depending on market conditions, speculators—who play an important
role in many commodity markets—either rely on technical or fundamental trading rules to de-
termine their excess demand. The price adjustment is approximated by a log-linear price impact
function. The log price S at time t + 1 is given as
St+1 = St + a[D
M
t + W
C
t D
C
t + W
F
t D
F
t ]; (1)
where a is a positive scaling coefﬁcient to calibrate the price adjustment, DM
t ;DC
t and DF
t stand
for the excess demand of the real economy, the chartists and the fundamentalists, respectively,
at time t. The weights of the chartists and the fundamentalists at time t are given as W C
t and
W F
t , respectively. According to (1), the price of the commodity increases when there is an
excess demand, and vice versa.
Demand and supply of the real economy is described in the reduced way DM
t = m(F ¡ St).
The log of the long-run equilibrium price is denoted by F and m is a positive parameter. For
1Their model is inspired by the so-called chartist-fundamentalist approach (e.g. Day and Huang (1990), Kirman
(1991), Brock and Hommes (1997), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Chiarella and He (2003)),
which is quite successful in explaining ﬁnancial market dynamics.3
instance, if S > F, then the supply of producers exceeds the demand of consumers and, as a
result, the excess demand of the real economy is negative.
Speculators are familiar with both technical and fundamental analysis. The excess demand
generated by technical analysis is formalized as DC
t = b(St ¡F), where b is a positive reaction
coefﬁcient. So-called chartists typically believe in bear and bull markets. As long as the price
is above (below) its long-run equilibrium value, chartists regard the market as bullish (bearish).
Since a further price increase (decrease) is expected, chartists tend to buy (sell) the commod-
ity. On the other hand, fundamental analysis presumes that prices revert toward their long-run
equilibrium value. If the price is below (above) its equilibrium value, higher (lower) prices are
expected and fundamental analysis favors buying (selling) the commodity. The excess demand
generated by fundamental analysis is written as DF
t = c(F ¡ St). The strength of fundamental
analysis depends on the positive reaction coefﬁcient c.
Speculators try to exploit bull and bear market situations. But the more the price deviates
from its long-run equilibrium value, the greater the speculators perceive the risk that the bull or
bear market might collapse. As a result, an increasing number of speculators opt for fundamen-
tal trading strategies. The market share of speculators who follow technical analysis is deﬁned
as W C
t = 1=[1+d(F ¡St)2]. The higher the positive parameter d, the faster speculators switch
to fundamental analysis as the mispricing increases. The weight of the fundamentalists is, of
course, W F
t = 1 ¡ W C
t .
The above analysis results in the law of motion of the model
St+1 = f(St) := St + a
·
m(F ¡ St) ¡ b
F ¡ St
1 + d(F ¡ St)2 + c
d(F ¡ St)3
1 + d(F ¡ St)2
¸
: (2)
A formal analysis of the properties of this one-dimensional nonlinear map and the impact of
price limiters are provided in He and Westerhoff (2005). For example, it is shown that for
a = 1;b = 4:5;c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0, the map possesses three unstable ﬁxed
points ( ¹ F = 0; ¹ S§ = §1:18322) and the model generates intricate (chaotic) price dynamics.
In particular, prices ﬂuctuate in a complex way between bull and bear markets, as observed in
many commodity markets.
3. PRICE LIMITERS AND BUFFER STOCKS
Control algorithms (e.g., Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990), Pyragas (1992), or Parthasarathy
and Sinha (1995)) have been developed to stabilize chaotic dynamics. The feasibility of us-
ing chaos controllers depends on the complexity and efﬁciency of the control algorithm. The
chaos control process typically requires measurement of the system’s state, generation of a con-
trol signal, and the application of a control signal to an accessible system parameter. Chaos
control of economic system is often regarded with some skepticism since such information is
hard to collect. Fortunately, Corron, Pethel and Hopper (2000) present experimental evidence
that chaos control can also be accomplished by using simple limiters. This method, which has
been analytically and numerically explored by Wagner and Stoop (2000) and Stoop and Wag-
ner (2003), simply restricts the phase space of a trajectory that can be explored. Limiter control
is obviously convenient to conduct, even in an economic context. For example, a central au-
thority which imposes price boundaries in commodity markets automatically applies the limiter
method. Clearly, price boundaries are a real-life application of limiter control.
To study the emergence of “butter mountains” and “milk lakes”, we explore the case of
minimum price limiters Smin. Hence, (1) becomes
St+1 = St + a[D
M
t + W
C
t D
C
t + W
F
t D
F
t + D
CA
t ] + ±t; (3)
where DCA
t stands for the interventions of the central authority and ±t is an IID noise term to
allow for additional market disturbances not captured by our stylized model. The interventions4
of the central authority just have to offset the excess supply in the market that would otherwise
push the price below Smin. Hence, it follows from (3) that DCA
t is deﬁned as
D
CA
t = max
½
Smin ¡ St ¡ ±t
a
¡ D
M
t ¡ W
C
t D
C
t ¡ W
F
t D
F
t ; 0
¾
: (4)
We are interested in the size or growth rate of the long-term average buffer stock BT =
1
T
PT
t=1 DCA
t , which is computed using T observations.
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FIGURE 1. The left-hand panels show bifurcation diagrams for lower price
boundaries. The price boundaries are increased from ¡2 to +2 in 500 discrete
steps. Foreachvalue, 100observationsareplotted. Therighthandpanelsdepicts
the corresponding growth rate of the buffer stock based on T = 1000. Parameter
setting as in section 2. Noise levels from top to bottom are given as ± » N(0;¾)
with ¾ = 0;0:1;0:2;0:3.
Fig. 1 reveals the impact of price limiters on the evolution of commodity prices (left-hand
panels) and the growth rate of the resulting buffer stocks (right-hand panels) with respect to
the minimum price limiters and the deterministic case and three noise cases. One can see that
the impact of the price limiters on the average growth rate of the buffer stock is neither ob-
vious nor intuitive in both deterministic and noise markets. Defending price boundaries may
require substantial interventions of the central authority and thus may lead to huge buffer stocks.
Consequently, the storage costs may be quite dramatic. This is consistent with the European ex-
perience where embarrassing “butter mountains” and “milk lakes” emerged after guaranteeing
farmers minimum prices. Also, the changes of the growth rate of the buffer stock with and with-
out market noise are very similar. However—and this is a surprising message—the growth rate5
of the buffer stock illustrated in Figure 1 depends in a nontrivial way on the established price
limiter. For some price limiters the growth rate of the buffer stock is slow (or even negligible).
What is the explanation for this puzzling outcome? In the following discussion, we focus on
the deterministic case and offer ﬁrst an intuitive explanation by looking at the changes of the
complex price dynamics resulting from a homoclinic orbit and then a more precise explanation
by calculating the growth rate in the buffer stocks under a price limiter. Consequently, we
obtain the mechanism in generating the optimal price limiters, under which the growth rates of
the buffer stocks are close to zero.
Forthegivensetofparameters, HeandWesterhoff(2005)showthatsimplepricelimitersmay
have unexpected consequences—a minimum (maximum) price limiter decreases (increases) the
average price. More precisely, map (2) is non-invertible and has three unstable ﬁxed points,
the fundamental price F and two non-fundamental prices S§ (satisfying S¡ < F < S+).
The trapping invariant interval of the map consists of two non-invariant overlapping trapping
intervals around the two non-fundamental prices. If the price limiter Smin is below the lower
bound of the invariant interval, prices evolve as usual and the growth rate of the buffer stocks
is zero. The price limiter starts to play a role once it is above the lower bound. As the price
limiter increases, the prices are effectively trapped in the invariant interval of the lower non-
fundamental price S¡ most of the time and the growth rate of the buffer stocks increases initially
and then decreases to zero when the price limiter is given by the lower non-fundamental price.
This explains the ﬁrst small “hump” of the average buffer stock for price limiters below S¡(=
¡1:18) in Fig. 1. A price limiter between S¡ and F prevents the price from constantly dropping
below the price limiter under the map. Also, the difference between Smin and f(St) increases
initially, reaching a local maximum when Smin corresponds to the local minimum point of the
function f, and then decreases to zero as the price limiter approaches F. This explains the
big “hump” for the averaged growth rate of the buffer stock between S¡ and F(= 0) in Fig. 1.
Whenthe price limiteris above F = 0, the pricelimiter traps theprice in theinvariantintervalof
S+ most of the time, leading to the “hump” growth rate of the buffer stocks below S+(= 1:18).
ItbecomeszerowhenSmin = S+. However, onceSmin isabovetheupperboundoftheinvariant
interval, theinterventionisalwaysneededtosupportthehighlower-pricelimiter. Consequently,
the growth rate of the buffer stock increases and becomes unbounded. This gives us an intuitive
explanation on the growth rate behavior of the buffer stocks.
We now give a more precise explanation by calculating the growth rate of the buffer stock (af-
ter transients) for a given limiter level. In fact, for the deterministic case, the buffer stock DCA
t
in (4) reduces to DCA
t = maxf[Smin ¡ f(St)]=a;0g. For limiters where f(Smin) < Smin, the
limiter is exercised continuously. That is, at every iteration, the limiter must provide additional
demand to raise the price to Smin. Thus, the growth rate that the buffer stock increases is pre-
cisely the scaled difference [Smin ¡ f(Smin)]=a. For the given set of parameters, the difference
is positive for Smin in between -1.18 and 0 and the resulting plot in the upper-left panel in Fig. 2
explains the large hump between -1.18 and 0 and the unbounded growth above 1.18. For limiter
values where f(Smin) > Smin but f(f(Smin)) < Smin, the limiter is exercised every second
iteration, and the growth rate of the buffer stock is given by [Smin ¡ f(f(Smin))]=(2a). This is
calculated for the Smin satisfying [Smin¡f(Smin)]=a · 0. The composite of the above two cal-
culations is shown in the upper-right panel in Fig. 2. Limiting every second iterate explains the
bumps just below 1.18 and -1.18. The remaining bumps are explained by limiters acting on still
higher order iterates. That is, f(Smin) > Smin;f(2)(Smin) > Smin;¢¢¢ ;f(N¡1)(Smin) > Smin,
but f(N)(Smin) < Smin, where f(i) indicates the i-th iterate of f. In that case the rate of buffer
growth is [Smin ¡ f(N)(Smin)]=(aN). The composite of the rate for all N up to 3 and 1000 is
shown in the down-left and down-right panels, respectively, in Fig. 2. The difference for N > 2
explains the remaining smaller bumps in the buffer stock growth. This agrees fairly well with
the “experimental” result in the top right plot in Fig. 1.6
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FIGURE 2. The composite of the average growth rate [Smin ¡
f(N)(Smin)]=(aN) for all N up to N = 1 (upper-left), 2 (upper-right), 3 (down-
left) and 1,000 (down-right) for 4001 evenly spaced values of Smin in the range
[-2,2].
The interesting limiter levels are the points of equality that separate the regions for different
N. These points are the so-called optimal limiter levels. For example, the boundary for N = 1
is deﬁned by f(Smin) = Smin, corresponding to the three ﬁxed points S§;F. In the absence
of noise, the growth rate of the buffer stock is precisely zero for these limiter levels. A similar
thing happens for N = 2. Here, the boundary is deﬁned by f(f(Smin)) = Smin, corresponding
to an unstable period-2 orbit of f. The effect of the limiter is to stabilize that periodic orbit
without growth in the buffer stock (in the absence of noise). More generally, a boundary for N
is given by f(N)(Smin) = Smin, corresponding to a period-N orbit. Thus a limiter set precisely
to the minimum value of an unstable periodic orbit will stabilize that orbit without growth in
the buffer stock. With noise the growth rate of the buffer stock is proportional to the average
magnitude of the noise.
Of course, the central authority may not exactly know these buffer stock “minimizing” price
boundaries. A central authority thus may experiment for some time with different price bound-
aries until an acceptable outcome has been approached. The main message of this paper is
that if price boundaries are politically desirable,
2 then a central authority has not necessarily to
accumulate large inventories.
4. CONCLUSIONS
A common concern for price boundaries in commodity markets is the fear of a more or less
unlimited growth of the buffer stock. Indeed, notorious surpluses in production of agricultural
goods and connected large storage costs have been repeatedly observed in history. Prominent
examples include the European “butter mountains” and “milk lakes”. In this paper, we explore
the impact of price limiters on the evolution of buffer stocks within a simple commodity mar-
ket model. Price limiters may in fact lead to large buffer stocks. However, the good news is
that there also exist some price limiters which stabilize price ﬂuctuations without generating
large inventories. Our paper also demonstrates that chaos control algorithms such as the limiter
method may help policy makers to improve the regulation of economic systems.
2Popular arguments in support of price boundaries are concerned with (i) a country’s autarky in agricultural supply,
(ii) the regulation of agricultural prices, and (iii) a stabilization of the farmers’ income.7
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